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Abstract 
Many important decisions are taken not by the person who will ultimately gain or lose from 
the outcome, but on their behalf by somebody else. We examined economic decision-making 
about risk and time in situations in which deciders chose for others who also chose for them. 
We propose that this unique setting, which has not been studied before, elicits perception of 
reciprocity that prompts a unique bias in preferences. We found that decision-makers are less 
patient (more discounting), and also more risk-averse for losses than gains, with other 
peoples’ money, especially when their choices for others are more uncertain. Those results 
were derived by exploiting a computational modelling framework that has been shown to 
account for the underlying psychological and neural decision processes. We propose a novel 
theoretical mechanism – precautionary preferences under social uncertainty, which explains 
the findings. Implications for future research and alternative models are also discussed. 
 
Keywords: decision making; risk preferences; time preferences; self-other differences; 
reciprocity. 
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“You can spend your own money on yourself. When you do that, why then you really watch 
out what you’re doing, and you try to get the most for your money.  …  Finally, I can spend 
somebody else’s money on somebody else. And if I spend somebody else’s money on 
somebody else, I’m not concerned about how much it is, and I’m not concerned about what I 
get. And that’s government. And that’s close to 40% of our national income.” 
Milton Friedman, Fox News interview (May 2004)  
 
Introduction 
Decisions on behalf of others are ubiquitous across much human social and economic 
activity (Stiglitz, 1987), from doctors taking decisions on behalf of patients to City traders 
deciding on behalf of investors (Wonderling, Gruen, & Black, 2005). For example, investors 
delegate to traders the responsibility to manage their money, which the former cannot 
continuously monitor and control. This is the case for most contracts written in a world of 
information asymmetry, uncertainty and risk. It is crucial therefore to understand how people 
actually make decisions on behalf of others and how this differs from when they make 
decisions on their own behalf. Taking a doctor as an example, subject to resource constraints, 
she might act in order to maximise a patient’s health (Williams, 1988; Culyer, 1989), 
maximise the economic utility of the patient by minimizing the financial cost (Evans, 1984), 
or maximise social welfare by minimising the cost to society (Mooney, 1994). 
Rich plethora of studies have reported how people decide on behalf of others. For 
example, studies using non-monetary decision outcomes (Beisswanger, Stone, Hupp, & 
Allgaier, 2003; Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2012; Kray, 2000; Kray & Gonzalez, 1999; 
Polman, 2012a; Stone et al., 2013; Wray & Stone, 2005; Zikmund-Fisher, Sarr, Fagerlin, & 
Ubel, 2006); hypothetical monetary outcomes (Bartels & Rips 2010; Borresen, 1987; Hsee & 
Weber, 1997; Takahashi, 2007; Ziegler & Tunney, 2012); between-subject designs that do 
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not directly compare the within-person decisions made for oneself with the same decisions 
made for somebody else (Fernandez-Duque & Wifall, 2007; Pronin, Olivola, & Kennedy, 
2008); outcomes that are only in the domain of risky gains without the possibility for losses 
(Stone, Yates, & Caruthers, 2002; Teger & Kogan, 1975); and within-subject designs that 
compare outcomes in the domain of both risky gains and risky losses (Cvetkovich, 1972; 
Polman, 2012a).  
In a review of the literature of risk taking for others, Polman (2012b, p.142) stresses 
that ‘much of the research on choosing-for-others deals with risk preferences, with some 
research reporting that decisions tend to be more risky when made on behalf of others 
(Beisswanger, Stone, Hupp, & Allgaier, 2003; Stone, Yates, & Caruthers, 2002; Wray & 
Stone, 2005; Ubel, Angott, & Zikmund-Fisher, 2011) and other research reporting that 
decisions tend to be less risky when made on behalf of others (McCauley, Kogan, & Teger, 
1971; Teger & Kogan, 1975; Wallach, Kogan, & Bem, 1964; Zaleska & Kogan, 1971).’ 
Given this doubt about whether choices for others are more or less risky compared to choices 
for the self, Polman (2012b) answers a different question: whether choices that people make 
for others are less loss-averse; and Andersson et al. (2016) also finds that deciding for others 
reduces loss aversion (less risk taking for self than others when gains and losses are possible). 
In intertemporal choices, the evidence is also mixed, with some research reporting that 
deciders are more patient (discount less) when deciding for others (Pronin, Olivola, & 
Kennedy, 2008; Ziegler & Tunney, 2012), and other research reporting that decisions tend to 
be more impatient (discount more) when deciding for others (Bartels & Rips, 2010; 
Takahashi, 2007). In summary, the mixed evidence for surrogate decisions clearly suggests 
that situational or contextual factors may be mediating those effects.  
A characteristic feature of the design of all previous studies is that decision makers are 
asked to make choices either for self, or for others, or for both self and others. In contrast to 
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this work, we uniquely study the kind of situations in which decision makers make decisions 
for others who also make decisions for them. This is an important topic to understand since 
many important relationships make decisions for each other. In any team situation, 
individuals are making decisions for others as well as on behalf of themselves. This also 
includes people in close relationships, close friends and married couples (e.g., spouses make 
decisions for each other frequently). Also, many situations where strangers are brought 
together to form a team with others to perform a task contains such reciprocal decision-
making (e.g., in the military, in business, and even some tasks in the TV programme ‘The 
Apprentice’). Individuals working in large organisations may also make such, often 
anonymous, decisions for each other.  
Because in reality there are many confounding factors that could explain preferences, 
such as memory of previous interactions for example, our design strips the decision task 
down to an anonymous interaction that preserves only the ‘reciprocity’ element under a set of 
neutral baseline conditions: confidentiality of the decisions and lack of opportunity for 
retaliation. Thus, the ‘you choose for me and I choose for you’ paradigm, where the ‘other’ 
subject is just chosen at random, should make only ‘reciprocity’ more salient, so we can 
study its unique effect on preferences in such situations. As it turns out, none of the previous 
studies in the literature have employed this setting. 
Uncertainty Moderates Decisions for Others 
Social interactions are plagued with uncertainty, because actors can never truly know 
what it is like to see or experience something from someone else's point of view (Harsanyi, 
1977; Nagel, 1974). Instead, people must rely on their best estimates of others’ beliefs and 
preferences to guide social decision-making (Yoshida, Dolan, & Friston, 2008) and choose 
carefully when outcomes affect the fate of others. Therefore, a likely moderator of decisions 
for others is uncertainty about others’ preferences and goals. Conversely, if we are certain 
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about what others want, regardless of how different from our own values, we are likely to 
implement those preferences in our choices for them (e.g., see Nicolle et al., 2012, for 
evidence that decisions for others are attuned to others’ preferences, and draw on brain 
mechanisms used when decisions are made for the self, if the actors have the opportunity to 
learn what the other person would decide in a similar situation). 
Computational Modelling of Decisions for Others 
Computational modelling of the underlying decision processes is informative in this 
task, because it is not clear whether decisions for others reveal preferences or some non-
preference-based decision strategies (see DellaVigna, 2009). Simply observing behavioural 
choices does not tell us what the underlying mechanisms of such decision-making may be. 
Specifically, according to popular economic and behavioural theories (DellaVigna, 2009), 
there are three stages through which decisions are made: (1) start with underlying preference 
(desires, ‘wants’ and ‘needs’); (2) then form beliefs about likelihood/probability of different 
outcomes; (3) and use a decision making rule to assess the available information and make a 
choice that satisfies the preferences, given the beliefs. Psychological factors can affect each 
step. For example, preferences are affected by the desire to avoid unpleasant emotions such 
as regret (e.g., Loomes & Sugden, 1982). Moreover, urges for immediate gratification create 
self-control problems and challenge the assumption that the discount factor is time-consistent 
(Laibson, 1997), and reference points challenge the assumption that decision utility depends 
on total lifetime wealth (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Beliefs are often formed following 
intuitions incapable of assessing actual risk, which lead to overconfidence about one’s 
abilities (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Different decision rules or heuristics are adopted to 
simplify decisions, under the constraint that rationality is bounded (Simon, 1997).  
Computational neuroscience and economics have offered a range of approaches to 
model such phenomena during those three stages of the decision-making process (Glimcher 
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et al., 2009; Rangel, Camerer, & Montague, 2008). The parameters of these models have 
even been found to correlate with neural activity in specific brain structures, which suggest, 
that those models might provide a mechanistic level of explanation of overt decision 
behaviours (see Glimcher et al., 2009). We employ such computational models to test the 
specific hypotheses about how individuals make financial decisions involving risk and time 
for self and for others. Such models are designed to reveal whether specific ‘preferences’ and 
‘decision rules’ account for observed behavioural choices.1 
In terms of this decision model, the uncertainty mechanism makes a prediction 
concerning the ‘decision rule’ that translates (time and risk) preferences into choices. 
Uncertainty in decision-making is reflected in choice noisiness, or more formally the 
reliability with which decision values are translated into choices (De Martino, Fleming, 
Garrett, & Dolan, 2013). The uncertainty principle makes two crucial predictions. First, it 
implies more noisy choices for others than for self in general. Second, if uncertainty 
moderates decisions for others, then preferences should be different between deciders with 
more and less noisy choices for others respectively. We tested those two predictions by 
assessing the noise in participants’ choices by fitting a stochastic decision rule with a noise 
parameter and estimating the parameter for decisions for self and others respectively. 
Experiment 1: Intertemporal Choice for Self and Others 
To examine preferences and decision rules for self and others, we designed an 
intertemporal choice task, which asked  participants to make choices between larger rewards 
delivered later, and smaller rewards delivered sooner, sometimes for themselves and other 
times on behalf of an anonymous other participant. It is known that different individuals 
display significant variability in their preferences, with relatively low-discounters preferring 
                                                          
1 Because payoff probabilities and delays will be explicitly presented in our decision tasks, we will model only 
changes in ‘preferences’ and ‘decision rules’, not ‘beliefs’. 
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to wait for a later higher-reward option and relatively high-discounters preferring the more 
immediate smaller reward (Kable & Glimcher, 2007; Pine et al 2009). This behavioural 
variability can be quantified by estimating an individual’s discount rate, a parameter which 
quantifies an individual’s disposition to discount the value of delayed relative to more 
immediate rewards. We were also interested in model parameters that could distinguish  
individuals both in their valuations and choice preferences. In previous studies of value 
comparison, ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) activity has been found to correlate 
with the subjective value of a chosen option or with the value difference between chosen and 
unchosen options (Basten, Biele, Heekeren, & Fiebach, 2010; Fitzgerald et al 2009) both 
when deciding for oneself and for others (Nicolle et al., 2012).      
Methods 
Participants.   Forty-five participants (23 male and 22 female) were randomly allocated 
to two groups of 22 and 23 subjects respectively. All subjects provided informed consent and 
the study was covered by approval granted by University College London Research Ethics 
Committee. All subjects were students at London universities  (the vast majority were 
undergraduates and from University College London). 
Design.   Subjects were invited to the laboratory and seated in separate cubicles to 
ensure privacy in decision making. To reinforce the social nature of the task, they were given 
written instructions (see Appendix A) which emphasised that their payoff may be determined 
by another subject’s choices, in which case the other subject’s payoff would be determined 
by their own choices. The study was conducted using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 
2007).  
The study consisted of 240 trials where, in each trial, a subject chose between two 
amounts to be received at different dates in the future for a beneficiary. The main treatment 
variable was a within-subject variation in the beneficiary of the decisions, which could be 
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either “Me” (i.e. the subject themselves), “Other (Female)” (i.e. another subject in the lab that 
was female) and “Other Male”.  In addition to being displayed on the screen, the background 
of the screen was colour coded depending on the beneficiary: black for self, light blue for 
another male and pink for another female. 
In each trial, the subject was shown a screen with the following information: the 
beneficiary of the trial (i.e. if that trial is chosen, this determines who receives the payoff), the 
trial number (from 1 to 240), and two payment options, which are framed as “Option i: £x in 
y weeks”) together with two buttons. Subjects could press only one button, corresponding to 
their chosen Option. To prevent accidental double clicks and to encourage subjects to think, 
the buttons did not appear until a second after the options were displayed. The options always 
had a higher amount of money at a later date (e.g. £17 in 20 weeks) in one option (the 
LATER option) and a lower amount of money at a sooner date (e.g. £14 in 1 weeks) in the 
other option (the SOONER option), but which Option was labelled Option 1 (and presented 
on the left of the screen) and which was labelled Option 2 (and presented on the right) was 
chosen at random; this enabled us to identify subjects that may have been consistent in their 
behaviour only because they clicked the same button each time. A screenshot of a specific 
trial is shown in Figure 1. 
The SOONER option payment date was always either 0, 1, or 2 weeks (0 weeks being 
the day of the experiment) and the LATER date varied between 1 and 25 weeks; the 
SOONER payment amount varied between zero and £24 and the LATER payment amount 
varied between £6 and £49. A number of attention checks were included in the parameter 
choices: i.e. options where the payment size was the same but the dates were different, or 
options where the dates were the same but the payment size was different and options where 
the payment size was zero. 
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There were 80 trials containing different possible combinations of magnitudes and 
delays reflecting a wide range of implied discount factors (for more information how the 
options were generated see Nicolle et al., 2012) and subjects faced the entire set once for each 
beneficiary. Trials were split up into blocks of 40 choices for the same beneficiary (all 
participants performed all three beneficiary conditions); the blocks were ordered at random as 
were the different trials within a block. There was a 30 second time between blocks for rest. 
Although subjects could make decisions at their own pace (there was no time limit – 
hence also no incentive to rush decisions), a session could not be completed until all subjects 
had completed their decision-making (as payoffs may depend on other subject’s decisions). 
After all subjects had completed all of their choices, subjects were randomly assigned to be 
paid based either on their own choice or the choice of another subject and one choice was 
randomly selected for each subject to be paid. 
In total, each session lasted about 65 minutes including reading instructions and dealing 
with payment administration. In order to completely isolate the effect of time discounting on 
decision making, there was no show up fee in this experiment, and subjects earned on 
average £25.64. Subjects were paid into their bank account or via Paypal at the time specified 
in the payoff-relevant choice (e.g. if the payoff-relevant choice was to be paid £17 in 20 
weeks, they were paid £17 exactly 20 weeks after the experiment). 
Behavioural modelling.  A function which describes the pattern of discounting can be 
estimated by observing choices between delayed outcomes.  Economic theories of rational 
behaviour posit that goods ought to be discounted exponentially with delay (Samuelson, 
1937). Formally, an outcome which has value or utility M if received immediately (T = 0) is 
worth γT ∙ M if delayed T periods into the future. The present-time Utility U of receiving M at 
time T is thus given by: 
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MU T         (1) 
Here the discount rate, γ, represents the constant proportional decrease in value with 
each added time period of delay. Contrary to predictions of exponential discounting a large 
body of evidence with both human and animal subjects has demonstrated that discount rates 
appear to decrease with increasing delays (Green & Myerson, 2004; Rubinstein, 2003). 
Again, each participant’s unique discount rate was estimated by fitting a discount function to 
their choices, whereby the discounted utility/value of an option (U) varies hyperbolically as a 
function of reward or payoff magnitude (M) and delay (T):  
T
M
U


1
       (2) 
A proposed alternative is the “quasi-hyperbolic” approximation to hyperbolic 
discounting (Laibson, 1997), which is formalized as exponential discounting, with an 
additional preference for immediate rewards (present bias), expressed as a second discount 
factor, δ, and applied to all time-periods except the first: 
)(0 T
T
T MMU                    (3) 
 Where MT0 is the immediate payoff, MT is the payoff in period T, δ is an individual’s 
present bias parameter and γ is the individual’s long-run discount factor. When δ = 1, 
individuals are not present biased and the quasi-hyperbolic model reduces to standard 
exponential discounting. Such present biased time preferences may be the result of the 
interplay between two separate decision-making systems: the aﬀective system which values 
immediate gratiﬁcation and the deliberative system which makes long-run plans and displays 
higher discount factors (McClure et al., 2004). 
Given a subjective (i.e., temporally discounted) value associated with each of the two 
(sooner vs. later) options in the pair, the associated probability of making each choice is 
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estimated with a softmax (logistic) decision rule, where β > 0 determines the randomness of 
the decision – higher numbers indicate more deterministic, less random choice (in our 
simulations β was constrained between 0 and 10):  
))()((1
1
)(
SoonerULaterUe
LaterP


                 (4) 
This is a standard stochastic decision rule that calculates the probability of taking one 
of two actions according to their relative subjective values (see Glimcher et al., 2009). This 
model also describes neural signals in medial prefrontal cortex, which compute the choice 
preferences of another individual as well as oneself – both in terms of subjective valuations 
of options and in terms of choices (see Nicolle et al., 2012). 
Critically, it is necessary to optimise the choice pairs such that they give the most 
efficient estimate of potential subjects’ discount rates. To optimise these choices, we 
generated a random 80 choice pairs, each comprising one smaller, sooner reward and one 
larger, more delayed reward, but with the magnitudes and delays varying across the pairs. We 
then computed the decisions predicted to be made by simulated subjects with discount rates 
ranging from 0 to 1. When plotted those simulated discount rates against the predicted 
number of choices of the delayed option, the closer this graph is to the diagonal, the better 
different discount rates are reflected in different subject choices, and therefore the lower the 
error introduced by the model estimation process (Nicolle et al., 212). We generated 10,000 
such choice sets and chose the set whose curve was closest to the diagonal (in terms of 
enclosed area). In this choice set, magnitudes ranged between £0 and £24 for sooner options, 
with their delays ranging from 0 to 2 weeks. For the more delayed options of each pair, the 
magnitudes ranged from £6 to £49, and the delays from 1 to 25 weeks, since these provided 
the lowest correlations in self and other choices and values. 
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The three choice models (Equations 1-3) were separately fit to participants’ choices in 
the pre-screen questionnaire, optimising their free parameters (γ), (δ), and (β) to maximise the 
likelihood of the choices (Equation 4) given the parameters. This was realised through 
standard Matlab functions used to compute maximum likelihood estimation. Model 
comparison was performed at the group level, by summation of individual log likelihoods. 
Selection between models proceeded using the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) 
(Schwarz, 1978), where L is the maximized group level log likelihood, k is the number of free 
parameters in the model and n the number of independent observations.  
BIC = –2 L + 2k ln(n)     (5) 
For BIC, Kass and Raftery (1995, p. 777) propose the following taxonomy of what 
constitutes a substantial difference in criterion values: 0–2 Weak; 2–6 Positive; 6–10 Strong; 
>10 Very Strong. We used BIC to compare between three versions of the model. 
Finally, after selecting the winning model, we included in the analysis only the 
participants for whom the model performed above certain minimum goodness-of-fit measure. 
We applied McFadden's Pseudo R-Squared (McFadden, 1979) to measure the improvement 
from null model to fitted model:    
)(ˆln
)(ˆln
1
0
2
ML
ML
R Full        (6) 
where MFull is the model with predictors, M0 is the model without predictors which 
assumes random choice, and Lˆ is the estimated likelihood. The likelihood for the null model 
is defined as follows:  
N
kML
1
)(ˆ 0             (7) 
where N is the number of choice options (each choice is equally likely so with two 
options 1/N = 0.5) and k is the number of observations or choices. Note that the theoretical 
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range is 0 < McFadden Pseudo R2 < 1, but as a rule of thumb, the model has an excellent fit 
when 0.20 < McFadden Pseudo R2 < 0.40 (McFadden, 1979, p. 307).2 
Results 
The computational modelling reveals important variance in the data, because it allows 
us to separate the effects preferences and choice uncertainty. The impact of delay depends on 
the participant’s preferences measured by their unique discount rate (γ), which was 
constrained to fall between 0 and 1. In our task, this was a reasonable constraint, as a subject 
with a discount rate of 1 would always choose the smaller sooner option on trials where the 
delay and magnitude favoured opposite choices. The hyperbolic discount model produced the 
best model fit (BIC = 6273) compared to the exponential model (BIC = 6283) and the quasi-
hyperbolic model (BIC = 6854) (note that smaller numbers reflect a better fit). With our 
winning hyperbolic model, replacing the separate parameters for Other decisions for males 
and females (βmale and βfemale; γmale and γfemale) with the single gender-independent free 
parameter (βother and γother) resulted in even better BIC performance: 5956 vs. 6273 
respectively. Here we present the statistical analysis of the parameters of this best-fitting self-
other hyperbolic model (although similarly significant results are obtained when analysing 
the parameters of the model with separate male and female parameters). 
We excluded from the analysis 4 participants (2 male and 2 female) for whom the 
model showed unsatisfactory McFadden's Pseudo R-Squared goodness-of-fit measure (mean 
R-Squared = .12), thus analysing the data from the 41 remaining participants (mean R-
Squared = .72). Table 1 presents the modelling results and the behavioural choices in each 
condition, according to beneficiary (Self and Other). The discounting parameters (γ) from this 
                                                          
2 Note that this procedure also controls for the effect of confounding factors such as, for example, choice fatigue 
or depletion due to the number of choices in each session. This is because such factors can only lead to 
randomness and inconsistency in choice, which should lead to worse fit of the model, and we have addressed 
this issue by excluding from the modelling part such participants. 
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winning model and the simpler metric (proportion delayed choices) were very highly 
correlated for Self (r = -0.81) and Other (r = -0.83). We analysed the distribution of the 
inferred individual time discounting parameters for Self and Other. The differences between 
the Self and Other conditions were examined with nonparametric statistical analysis, because 
this variable was not normally distributed according to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of 
normality for Self (D = 0.33, p < .001) and Other (D = 0.31, p < .001). The Wilcoxon Signed 
Ranks Test revealed that the discounting parameter (γ) was significantly higher in Other 
beneficiary condition compared to Self, Z = 2.78, p = .006. The behavioural data from those 
participants revealed the same pattern. The proportion of delayed choices was significantly 
higher in the Self beneficiary condition compared to Other, Z = 3.31, p = .001 (t(40) = 3.02, p 
= .004, using paired-samples t-test).3 The individual level analysis revealed that for 27 of the 
participants the time preference estimate γ was smaller when making decisions for oneself 
than for other (M = 0.06, SD = 0.18), while 14 participants exhibited the opposite pattern – 
the time preference estimate was larger when making decisions for oneself (M = 0.01, SD = 
0.03). Note, however, that the magnitude of the difference is negligible when discounting for 
self is larger (i.e. those individuals could be considered as having equal discounting for self 
and other). 
                                                          
3 We also analysed the effect of gender on choices, but did not find significant results. The differences between 
the conditions were examined with a mixed-model two-way (Beneficiary x Gender) univariate analysis of 
variance (General Linear Model), with Beneficiary as within-subject variable, participant Gender as between-
subject variable, and the mean proportion of choices of the later (delayed) option as the dependent measure. 
There was a significant main effect of Beneficiary, F(2, 86) = 6.93, p = .002 (2 = .14). Post-hoc analysis 
revealed that, after Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons, the proportion of later picks for Self was 
significantly higher than the proportions for both Male (p = .010) and Female (p = .043) others, while Male was 
not significantly different from Female others (p = 1.000). There was no significant main effect of the 
participant’s own Gender, F(1, 43) = 0.54, p = .467 (2 = .01), suggesting that male and female participants did 
not exhibit different levels of impatience (i.e., delay discounting). The Beneficiary x Gender interaction was also 
not significant, F(2, 86) = 0.30, p = .739 (2 = .01), which means that male and female participants did not 
respond differently when choosing for a same- or an opposite-sex beneficiary (i.e., the degree of time 
discounting, indicated by the proportions of later choices, did not vary depending on the gender of the decision 
maker and the beneficiary respectively). 
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We also analysed how the choice randomness parameter (β) varied across the two 
conditions, which tested the key prediction that the uncertainty in decision-making is 
reflected in choice noisiness, or more formally the fidelity with which decision values are 
translated into choices (De Martino et al., 2013). Recall that the uncertainty principle predicts 
more noisy choices for others than for self. Also, if uncertainty moderates decisions for 
others, then those preferences should be different between deciders with more or less noisy 
choices for others respectively. We used nonparametric statistical analysis, because this 
variable was not normally distributed according to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of 
normality for Self (D = 0.34, p < .001) and Other (D = 0.44, p < .001). The Wilcoxon Signed 
Ranks Test revealed that the average β across participants was significantly higher when 
deciding for Self beneficiary compared to Other, Z = 3.52, p < .001 (i.e., decisions were less 
deterministic, or more random, for Others). The next step in the analysis was to determine 
whether the difference between β for Other moderates the self-other differences in 
discounting. We did a median split of the betas (β) for Other which divided the sample into 
High and Low uncertainty group depending on whether they were below or above the median 
β respectively. The between-subject tests revealed that discounting was significantly different 
between those groups – more discounting for lower β i.e. when the participants were more 
uncertain/random about the preferences of Other. Specifically, the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks 
Test revealed that the discounting parameter (γ) was significantly higher for Other beneficiary 
in the High (M = 0.12, SE = .05; Median = 0.06) compared to the Low (M = 0.09, SE = .05; 
Median = 0.02) uncertainty group respectively, Z = 2.44, p = .015. The Self-Other differences 
in discounting was also higher in the High (M = 0.07, SE = .05; Median = 0.02) compared to 
the Low (M = 0.01, SE = .01; Median = 0.00) uncertainty group, Z = 2.53, p = .012. The 
behavioural data from those participants revealed the same pattern. The proportion of delayed 
choices for Other was significantly smaller in the High (M = 0.68, SE = .04; Median = 0.69) 
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compared to the Low (M = 0.82, SE = .05; Median = 0.90) uncertainty group, Z = 2.78, p = 
.005. Similarly, the Self-Other difference in proportions of delayed choices was higher in the 
High (M = 0.09, SE = .03; Median = 0.07) compared to the Low (M = 0.01, SE = .01; Median 
= 0.00) uncertainty group, Z = 2.77, p = .006. Note that the differences between the High and 
Low uncertainty groups were examined with nonparametric statistical analysis, because all 
variables were not normally distributed according to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of 
normality for Other γ (D = 0.31, p < .001), Self-Other γ (D = 0.34, p < .001), Other 
proportions (D = 0.15, p = .019), Self-Other proportions (D = 0.20, p < .001). 
Discussion 
The behavioural results and the modelling parameters for time discounting showed that 
individuals are more impulsive (less patient) with other peoples’ money. Our modelling 
results also revealed that choices are more random when making time-money trade-offs for 
others, which indicates uncertainty about their preferences. We also observed more impatient 
decisions for others in decision makers with noisier choices for the others, which supports the 
prediction that uncertainty about others’ preferences moderates decision making. Thus, the 
study revealed unique biases in both the preferences and also in the decision rules that 
individuals employ when making a choice that satisfies their time preferences (in line with 
the decision framework proposed at the beginning, DellaVigna, 2009).  
Experiment 2: Risky Choice for Self and Others 
We also investigated whether decision making under risk is different when people use 
their own money rather than somebody else’s money. We did not test for differences in 
behaviour for male and female beneficiaries in this study for two reasons. First, because this 
hypothesis has already been established in risky choice for self and others (e.g., Cvetkovich, 
1972; Stone & Allgaier, 2008; Stone et al., 2002); and second, because removing the gender 
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factor from our design provided enhanced power for assessing the effect of decision 
(gain/loss) valence.   
Methods 
Participants.   Fifty individuals participated in the study; the study was conducted in 
three groups of 18, 18 and 16 subjects (33 females and 17 males). All subjects had previously 
provided informed consent and the study was covered by approval granted to the Department 
of Economics from the University College London Research Ethics Committee. All subjects 
were students at London universities  (the vast majority were undergraduates and from 
University College London). 
Design.   Subjects were invited to the laboratory and seated in separate cubicles to 
ensure privacy in decision making. To reinforce the social nature of the task, they were again 
given written instructions (see Appendix B) which emphasised that their payoff would be 
partly determined by another subject’s choices, and their “partner’s” payoff would depend 
partly on their payoffs. The study was conducted using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 
2007).  
Screenshots of two trials are shown in Figure 2 – the task was adapted from Wright et 
al. (2012). In each trial, participants needed to choose between a “Gamble” option and a 
“Sure” option. First, the participants saw a blank screen with fixation cross; second, they 
were shown the pie chart with 4 sectors for the gamble option and the value of the Sure 
option; after the pie chart had been displayed for four seconds, two buttons appeared, one of 
which they  pressed to register their choice.  
If the “Gamble” option is selected, subjects win one of the four specified amounts with 
a probability given by the corresponding area of the pie chart. If the “Sure” option is chosen, 
subjects win the specified “Sure amount” for certain. The colours (chosen from a set of 
neutral colours) and the order and orientation of the pie sectors is determined at random. 
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Wright et al. (2012) showed that the degree of risk in those lotteries positively correlated with 
neural activity in posterior parietal cortex, a region strongly associated with risk; while the 
manipulation of ‘valence’ was expressed in greater activity for gains than losses in value-
related areas of orbitofrontal cortex and bilateral striatum. 
The study investigated two main factors. The first factor was the effect of beneficiary, 
whereby subjects played half the trials on behalf of themselves and half on behalf of another 
subject in the laboratory. The beneficiary was displayed on the screen in each individual trial. 
The second factor was the effect of winning versus losing money in a trial – the so-called 
‘valence effect’. Half the trials were in the “Gain” domain where the gamble amounts and 
sure amount were positive and the other half were in the “Loss” domain where they were 
negative. This provided a 2x2 factorial design in this basic design with within-subject factors 
for valence (gain or loss); and beneficiary (self or other). For each subject, the first half of the 
session was played for one beneficiary and the second half for the other beneficiary; within 
each half, gain and loss trials were played in a random order. The colour of the background 
screen was specific to the beneficiary type.  
There were 49 distinct gamble options and they were played 4 times each by each 
subject (once for each combination or gain/loss and self/other) for a total of 196 decisions per 
subject. The sure option was always a gain or loss of £3 and the gamble options ranged from 
£0 to £6. Thus, across the set of 49 gain trials, we parametrically manipulated the degree of 
risk in the lottery (using 7 levels of variance) and orthogonally manipulated its EV (7 levels). 
One-half of the lotteries had an EV above the sure amount and one-half below (mean EV 
across all 49 lotteries was equal to the sure option), which provided a simple metric of risk 
preference indexed as the proportion of riskier choices made (proportion risky choices: risk-
neutral, 0.5; risk-averse, <0.5; risk-seeking, >0.5). To manipulate valence, we created 49 
perfectly matched loss trials by multiplying all amounts in our gain trials by -1 (see also 
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Wright et al., 2012, for more information on how these trials were constructed). The full set 
of trial parameters was seen once in each cell of the design in every session, so the full set 
was shown 4 times in total – gain and loss for self and other respectively.  
Participants’ payments comprised a £5 show up fee, plus a £12 initial endowment 
(allowing for any losses occurred in the loss frame trials), plus the outcome of 4 randomly 
chosen trials – two where the subject chose on behalf of themselves (one gain and one loss 
frame) and two where another subject chose on their behalf (one gain and one loss frame). 
The £12 covered the worst possible outcome (where participants won £0 in the gain frame 
and lost £6 in the loss frame). Sessions lasted about an hour including reading instructions 
and processing payments and subjects earned an average of £17. 
Behavioural modelling.   In our analysis, we assessed whether the participants become 
noisier in their choices for the other person by fitting a choice model to choices in each of the 
four cells of the factorial design (gain/loss, self/other) in which the utility of the sure and 
gamble options are computed in each trial (using a mean-variance utility function), with the 
softmax (logistic) decision rule used to choose between them. Therefore, we estimated a risk 
parameter and noise parameter in each condition for each subject. We modelled individual 
choices using a binary logistic regression utility model. On each trial the subjective values, or 
utilities (U), of both options (Gamble vs. Sure) were computed using a utility function; and 
then these values were compared with generated trial-by-trial probability of accepting the 
lottery, using a softmax function with a free parameter β (constrained between 0 and 10) that 
allows for noise in action selection as follows: 
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Note that this randomness/noisiness parameter β is also shown to correlate with 
prefrontal neural structures (anterior frontopolar cortex) that control for exploration versus 
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exploitation strategies in decision making under uncertainty (Daw et al., 2006). Also, in line 
with prefrontal cortex’ role as the principal region implicated in behavioural control, Daw et 
al showed that activity in the orbitofrontal and ventro-medial prefrontal cortices correlates 
with the probability assigned by the model to the action chosen on a given trial (in the 
softmax model, this probability is a relative measure of the expected reward value of the 
chosen action).                                                                 
We then define the subjective value, or utility (U), of each lottery using the mean-
variance model: 
U(Gamble) = EV + ρVar     (9) 
EV is the expected (mean) value, Var is the variance of the gamble option. For a given 
lottery with N potential outcomes (m1, m2, … mN), with probabilities p = p1, p2, … pn, we 
define those statistical moments as follows: 
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where ρ is an risk parameter (constrained between -1 and +1) reflecting the taste for 
risk, with zero indicating risk neutrality, a positive number risk seeking and a negative 
number risk aversion), and β reflects choice noisiness. Equation 10 also represents the most 
basic mean model while Equation 9 is known as the classic mean-variance model 
(Markowitz, 1952; Bossaerts, 2010). In the mean–variance–valence model, on each trial the 
subjective values, or utilities (U), of both options (A and B) were computed using the above 
utility function, where ρ = ρ gain in gain trials and ρ = ρ loss in loss trials. Wright et al. (2012) 
show that this mean–variance–valence model best predicts behavioural data in this task 
compared to the basic expected value model (without variance term), the classic mean-
variance model, the expected utility model (Camerer, 2003), the prospect theory model 
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(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), and the cumulative prospect theory model (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992). This winning model enables extending ideas derived from financial 
economics that individuals respond to risk as measured by the variance in potential outcomes 
(Markowitz, 1952; Bossaerts, 2010), by incorporating valence. Also, Wright et al. 
demonstrate that the components of this model correlate with activity in brain regions in the 
parietal and temporal cortices, anterior insula, and the ventral striatum, which are known to 
encode risk information and decision utility. 
In this model, there is no constant term as we assume a utility of 0 represents a point of 
subjective indifference between sure or gamble (i.e., rejection of offer has a utility of 0). We 
optimised subject-specific ρ and β parameters using nonlinear optimization implemented in 
Matlab for maximum likelihood estimation. In our simulations of the observed decisions for 
self and other, we extended the mean-variance model by replacing the parameters ρ and β 
with separate parameters for self-trials (ρself and βself) and other-trials (ρother and βother). Model 
fitting resulted in a set of maximum likelihood parameter estimates for each subject. Model 
comparison was performed at the group level (fixed effects), by summation of log likelihoods 
across participants. As in the previous study, selection between models proceeded using the 
Bayesian information criterion (BIC) (Schwarz, 1978).   
We used BIC to compare the following three models, which allowed us to ask whether 
decision behaviour for self and other was influenced by risk and valence (i.e., every model 
was fit to all the data for each subject). First, a simple mean model (see Equation 10) assumed 
that individuals only cared about the mean value of the options. Second, we asked whether 
choice was also influenced by risk, using a mean–variance model (see Equation 9). Third, we 
asked whether both risk and valence influence choice, using a mean–variance–valence model 
with separate risk parameter that reflects risk preference in gain trials and loss trials 
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respectively.4 Again, after selecting the winning model, we included in the analysis only the 
participants for whom the model performed above the minimum McFadden's Pseudo R-
Squared goodness-of-fit measure. 
Results 
The behavioural modelling revealed that the mean–variance–valence model produced 
the best model fit (BIC = 11013) compared to the mean–variance model (BIC = 11225) and 
the mean model (BIC = 12137). 5 With our winning model, replacing the single free 
parameter in our softmax decision rule (β) with separate parameters for gain trials (βgain) and 
loss trials (βloss) resulted in worse BIC performance: 11013 vs. 11388 respectively.  
We included in the analysis the 40 participants for whom the model showed satisfactory 
McFadden's Pseudo R-Squared goodness-of-fit measure (mean R-Squared = .35), while for 
the excluded 10 participants this measure indicated that their behaviour was random and 
inconsistent (mean R-Squared = .15) (McFadden, 1979). Risk-related parameters (ρ) from 
this winning model and the simpler metric (proportion risky choices) were very highly 
correlated for gain and loss trials in both conditions (self-gain, r = 0.80; self-loss, r = 0.95; 
other-gain, r = 78; other-loss, r = 0.82). 
Table 2 presents the behavioural and modelling results in each condition. Analysing the 
data from those participants alone, differences between conditions were examined with a 
repeated-measures two-way (Beneficiary x Valence) univariate analysis of variance (General 
Linear Model), with the mean risk aversion parameter (ρ) as the dependent measure. There 
                                                          
4 We did not fit any version of prospect theory, because the mean-variance model has been consistently shown 
to outperform prospect theory in this task (Wright et al., 2012; Wright, Symmonds, Morris, & Dolan, 2013). 
5 Similarly to Wright et al. (2012), we also explored inter-individual differences to seek further evidence of 
behavioural independence between the influences of risk and valence. If these influences result from stable and 
independent processes, we can predict that knowing an individual’s sensitivity to one influence would not 
predict sensitivity to the other. We conducted additional analysis, in which for each participant, the average 
proportion of riskier choices indexes risk preference, and the difference in riskier choices between gain and loss 
domains indexes the impact of valence. Crucially, these preferences were independent, with risk and valence 
effects showing no correlation across subjects for either Self (r = 0.03; p = 0.928) or Other (r = – 0.159; p = 
0.270). 
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was no significant main effect of Beneficiary, F(1, 39) = 0.09, p = .765 (2 = .00), indicating 
that those participants were not more risk-averse when deciding for Self (vs. Other). There 
was still a significant main effect of Valence, F(1, 39) = 9.99, p = .003 (2 = .20), which 
means that the inferred risk aversion parameter was significantly lower (more risk averse) for 
Losses. The Beneficiary x Valence interaction was significant, F(1, 39) = 5.34, p = .026 (2 = 
.12), which confirms our hypothesis that the gain-loss asymmetry in choices is bigger when 
deciding for Others. 
The behavioural data from those participants showed the same pattern. For each 
individual, the behavioural proportion of risky choices indexes risk preference, which was 
derived separately for each cell in the (Beneficiary x Domain) design: Self-Gain, Self-Loss, 
Other-Gain, Other-Loss. The differences between the conditions were examined with a 
repeated-measures two-way (Beneficiary x Domain) univariate analysis of variance (General 
Linear Model using probit link function), with the mean proportion of risky choices as the 
dependent measure. There was no significant main effect of Beneficiary, F(1, 39) = 2.60, p = 
.115 (2 = .06), indicating that those participants were not more risk-averse when deciding for 
Self (vs. Other). There was significant main effect of Valence, F(1, 39) = 6.19, p = .017 (2 = 
.14), which means that the inferred risk aversion parameter was significantly lower (more risk 
averse) for Losses. The Beneficiary x Valence interaction was significant, F(1, 39) = 3.68, p 
= .063 (2 = .09), which confirms that the gain-loss asymmetry in choices is different 
between beneficiaries. 
 Finally, we analysed how the choice randomness parameter (β) varied across the two 
conditions, because uncertainty in decision-making is reflected in choice noisiness – the 
fidelity with which decision values are translated into choices (De Martino et al., 2013). The 
choice randomness parameter (β) was significantly higher in the Self beneficiary condition 
compared to Other, t(39) = 3.07, p = .004 (using paired-samples t-test). This indicates that the 
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choices for Other were more uncertain (less deterministic) than for Self. If uncertainty when 
choosing for others moderates risky decision making, then the valence effect might be 
different between deciders with more noisy choices for others compared to deciders with less 
noisy choices for others. Testing this prediction involves determining whether the degree of 
randomness (uncertainty) for Other explains the magnitude of the valence effect when 
deciding for others. Our analysis supported this prediction. Again, we did a median split of 
the betas (β) for Other which divided the sample into High and Low uncertainty group 
depending on whether they were below or above the median β respectively. The between-
subject tests revealed that the valence effect was significantly different between those groups 
– the difference between risk aversion for gains compared to losses was bigger when β was 
low i.e. when the participants were more uncertain about the preferences of Other. 
Specifically, the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test revealed that the difference between the risk 
aversion parameter (ρ) for Gain and Loss for Other was significantly bigger in the High 
uncertainty group (M = 0.19, SE = .06; Median = 0.16) compared to the Low uncertainty 
group (M = 0.06, SE = .03; Median = 0.05), Z = 2.30, p = .021. The differences were 
examined with nonparametric statistical analysis, because this variable was not normally 
distributed according to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality (D = 0.17, p = .006). The 
behavioural data from those participants revealed the same pattern. The difference between 
the proportion of risky choices in the Gain and Loss domain for Other was significantly 
bigger in the High uncertainty group (M = 0.14, SE = .04; Median = 0.13) compared to Low 
uncertainty group (M = 0.03, SE = .03; Median = 0.05), t(38) = 2.05, p = .047. The difference 
was examined with standard parametric statistical t-test, because this variable was normally 
distributed (D = 0.07, p = .200). 
Discussion 
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The novel findings from this experiment concern differences in risk preferences and 
decision rules that individuals employ when making choices for others compared to choices 
for self in reciprocal situations. We found bigger gain-loss asymmetry in risk preferences 
when deciding for others compared to oneself (i.e., more risk-averse choices in the domain of 
losses, relative to gains, when choosing on behalf of others). This counterintuitive result was 
revealed only thanks to the use of mechanistic modelling that accounts for the underlying 
choice processes. We also found that choices are more random when deciding for others, 
irrespective of the underlying risk attitude, which supports the prediction about the role of 
uncertainty in decision making for others. This was also revealed by the computational model 
employed in the analysis. We also observed larger valence effect for others in decision-
makers with noisier choices for others, which supports the prediction that uncertainty about 
others’ preferences moderates risky decisions. This specific result could also have important 
implications for understanding how such decisions are made in the real world. 
Our results replicate the greater gambling for gains than losses, which was repeatedly 
shown previously in this task (Wolf et al., 2013; Wright et al., 2012; Wright, Morris, Guitart-
Masip, & Dolan, 2013; Wright, Symmonds, Morris, & Dolan, 2013). Wright et al. explain 
these findings within a biologically grounded, process-based account of choice that 
progresses from option evaluation to action selection. At a mechanistic level, in the brain, it 
has been argued that there are a number of interacting valuation systems that together 
determine choice, including a separate the Pavlovian system for automatic approach-
avoidance responses and a goal-directed system for reflective planning (Rangel, Camerer, & 
Montague, 2008). This model predicts that in the choice process, risk and valence (gain/loss) 
independently engage automatic approach–avoidance mechanisms. In simple instrumental 
tasks approach–avoidance mechanisms underlie important valence effects, evident in a close 
coupling between punishment and nogo (avoid) responses, and between reward and go 
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(approach) responses (Dickinson & Balleine, 2002; Guitart-Masip et al., 2012). Wright, 
Morris, Guitart-Masip and Dolan (2013) show valence perturbs an individual's choices 
independently of the impact of risk, and causally implicate approach-avoidance processes as 
important in shaping risky choice (individuals exhibit base-level of risk-taking consistent 
across time and context, but valence perturbs choices around that base-level). Depending on 
context, this mechanism can produce either risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses 
or vice versa. Wright et al. show that individuals chose a riskier option less often with losses 
when the instrumental requirement was to approach (select) as opposed to avoid (accept / 
reject) it. The observation that stimuli signaling loss induce avoidance is consistent with our 
design, where the number of potential losses in the gamble (that does not contain £0 loss 
outcome) are more salient than the single loss option, thus triggering avoidance of the 
gamble; which leads to more risk aversion for loss-gambles than for gain-gambles (where the 
number of potential gains trigger approach tendencies instead). In summary, those studies 
(including ours) illustrate the variety of intricate ways in which context determines how 
humans respond to aversive stimuli.  
General Discussion 
The behavioural results and the computational modelling reveal that individuals are less 
patient and more risk-averse for losses than for gains with other peoples’ money. These 
unique findings are contingent on the kind of situations we are studying – ones in which 
decision makers make decisions for others who also make decisions for them. This setting, 
unique among previous research on self-other decision making, is likely to elicit perception 
of reciprocity. Next we offer possible explanations of the observed behaviours.  
Reciprocity Triggers Precautionary Decisions 
The perceived reciprocity in such situations might affect decision making in a specific 
way. In particular, reciprocity could motivate people to minimise others’ costs, relative to 
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their own cost. In policy making, the precautionary principle prohibits actions that carry a 
risk of causing harm and imposes that decision-makers should prove that actions are harmless 
(Sunstein, 2005). This moral principle, or attitude, is consistent with observations that people 
dislike causing bad outcomes, especially outcomes that affect others (Cushman, Gray, 
Gaffey, & Mendes, 2012; Ritov & Baron, 1990; Tetlock & Boettger, 1994); which also 
reflects a widespread social norm that prohibits harming others and results in punishment 
when violated (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Henrich et al., 2010). In decision-theoretic (cost-
benefit) terms, every ‘harm’ (such as pain, monetary loss, and time delay) is conceptualised 
as a specific type of ‘cost’, which should elicit precautionary decision making for others. For 
specific harms, such as pain, such ‘moral sentiment’ (see Smith, 1759) even leads to a 
disposition to over-value others’ suffering, relative to one’s own, which is elegantly 
demonstrated by Crockett et al. (2014) who found that majority of people selflessly sacrificed 
more money to prevent a stranger’s pain than their own pain (i.e., when participants were 
responsible for others’ pain, most of them evaluated the cost of that pain as higher than their 
own). In this respect, Crockett et al. propose that in decisions about losses, if decision-makers 
assume that the recipient’s mapping from a given level of cost to subjective unpleasantness is 
non-linear, then this uncertainty could induce a form of risk premium in the moral costs of 
imposing what might be intolerable cost on another. At this stage, decision-makers prefer to 
avoid these moral costs by adopting a conservative decision strategy leading them to 
systematically err on the side of reducing others’ pain. 
There are solid arguments why a reciprocity context would heighten precautionary 
preferences. One idea proposed by Crockett et al. (2014) is that such preferences likely 
evolved in a reciprocity context, i.e. in real life most behaviour is public and harming others 
will trigger punishment. So to avoid this potential punishment people err on the side of 
caution. Social norms that prohibit harm to others are widespread, and violation of these 
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norms is often punished (see Buckholtz & Marois, 2012; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Henrich 
et al. 2010). Therefore, an overall preference to avoid others’ suffering, relative to one’s own 
suffering, has selective value, especially when reciprocity is salient. In such situations, those 
who are more cautious when deciding about others’ pain would thus be less likely to suffer 
the costs of such punishments. Such preferences could either be innate or learned through 
social experience. In our study, the experimental design makes a concern for reciprocity 
salient, since participants are deciding for each other, so this could make precautionary 
strategy more likely.  
In the context of decisions for others involving risk and time, the hypothesis that 
reciprocity triggers precautionary preferences, which may be moderated by social 
uncertainty, makes specific predictions.  
In time discounting for others, there are two predictions stemming from our proposed 
model. First prediction is that deciders will be more impatient by choosing sooner-smaller 
payoffs when deciding for others, relative for self, which is exactly what we observed. This is 
because the proposed (reciprocity -> precautionary preference) mechanism should motivate 
deciders to minimise the potential harm to others, which is the delay until receiving the 
reward. Note that according to the standard cost-benefit framework in economics (Kreps, 
1990), intertemporal choice involves a trade-off between money (benefit) and time/delay 
(cost), which is why longer delays demand bigger payoffs. Psychologically, it is also very 
likely that in discounting with rewards, where both outcomes are framed as ‘gains’, the delay 
is the most salient cost. Nevertheless, an alternative assumption may be that if decision 
makers want to minimize the harm in their decisions for others, then they may choose 
waiting, because a more salient cost than the cost related to waiting is the cost related to 
receiving less money (i.e., people might believe that losing money is more harmful than 
losing time). In support of the delay-as-cost assumption, we conducted a statistical analysis 
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showing that the observed behavioural effect is moderated by participants' individual 
discount rates. Specifically, the more impatient deciders should be more likely to treat time as 
a worse cost. The prediction is that high discounters focus on the cost of delay, and therefore 
have a bigger difference between self and other discounting, in the direction of discounting 
more for others. We did a median split of the participants into high and low discounters group 
respectively, and the average difference between the discounting parameters for self and 
other was significantly bigger in the high discounting group (M = 0.118) than the low 
discounters group (M = 0.004), Z = 2.46, p = .014. Note also that increased impatience in 
choices for others cannot not driven by increased concavity in the utility function for money 
for others; because, even though the preference elicitation procedure does not correct for 
curvature in the utility function, this explanation implies the decision-makers should also be 
more risk-averse for gains when deciding for others – in fact, we observed the opposite 
pattern in the risk taking task. 
Second prediction is that the more uncertain decision-makers are about others, the more 
precaution they will exercise by choosing sooner (smaller) payoffs. Note that social 
uncertainty stems from individuals not knowing as much about other people's time 
preferences and future plans as they do about their own preferences and plans (especially 
when the recipients are anonymous strangers). This might make decision-makers concerned 
about choosing delayed rewards for other people because, for example, they do not know if 
the other person might hate waiting, might have immediate needs, might be leaving the 
country and closing their bank account, or might otherwise not be able to receive the delayed 
reward. In line with this intuition, Bartels and Rips (2010) demonstrate that decisions for 
others tend to be more impatient when a recipient is expected to undergo a significant change 
in circumstances or a life-changing event. In formal terms, uncertainty about others would 
amount to less precise estimate of another person’s future states compared to one’s own 
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future states. Therefore, if our participants are uncertain about others’ states, they may also 
judge providing the other person with sooner rewards to be the favourable, ‘safer’ option. Our 
analysis supported this prediction – more discounting for others when uncertainty parameter 
is higher for Others.  
In risky choice for others, the proposed mechanism also makes two key predictions. 
First prediction is that we should observe bigger gain-loss asymmetry in risk preferences 
when deciding for others compared to oneself, i.e., more risk-averse choices in the domain of 
losses, relative to gains, when choosing on behalf of others. This is because precautionary 
preference commands more risk-aversion with others’ money when choosing between losing 
a fixed amount (e.g., £-3) for sure versus a gamble offering several negative outcomes (e.g., 
£-1, £-1.25, £-5.75, £-6). In such cases, choosing the fixed £-3 loss avoids the worst potential 
harm (£-6) which is the most salient cost. This prediction is in line with Paul Slovic's research 
in risk perception who has identified a number of factors that contribute to perception of risk, 
including the potential for large or catastrophic losses and affective reactions such as sense of 
‘dread’ (Slovic, 1987). More recent research has also demonstrated that the top ranking risk 
factors are related to the possibility for very large loss of the invested money and the feeling 
of loss of control over the course of the investment (Vlaev, Chater, & Stewart, 2009). In 
contrast, when all choice outcomes are gains, there is no potential harm in selecting the 
gamble, which implies that, given the uncertainty about others’ preferences, decisions for 
others should be close to risk-neutrality while decisions for self will be risk-averse as 
observed before (Vlaev, Stewart, & Chater, 2008; Rieger, Wang, & Hens, 2015). In 
summary, the proposed processes imply the deciders will be more risk-averse for losses and 
Other People’s Money     32 
 
more risk-seeking for gains when deciding for others relative to self, which will result, as we 
observed, in bigger gain-loss asymmetry in risk preferences when deciding for others.6 
Second prediction is that social uncertainty about others’ preferences will moderate 
precautionary decision making under risk. Specifically, precautionary harm aversion predicts 
avoiding the worst harm in the loss domain, which commands choosing more risk-aversely – 
since all options are losses, the choice between a certain loss and a gamble offering several 
potential losses (some bigger, some smaller than the certain loss) should make the certain-
smaller-loss more attractive (it minimizes the maximum potential harm). In the gain domain, 
in contrast, the choice is between a certain gain and a gamble offering several gains (some 
bigger, others smaller), so there is no potential harm when choosing the gamble; therefore, 
under conditions of uncertainty about others’ needs and wants, one should focus on attaining 
the maximum possible payoff and be more risk seeking. Therefore, when deciding for others, 
the valence effect should be larger when deciders are more uncertain; which is exactly what 
we observed. 
Alternative Explanations 
Hsee and Weber (1997) outline two hypotheses concerning preferences for self and 
other, which predict uniquely different behavioural choices: default preference and 
preference-as-feeling.7 The default preference hypothesis, analogous to the false consensus in 
social psychology (Marks & Miller, 1987), assumes that people use their own preference to 
predict that of others and, as such, assume others have the same preference as themselves. 
                                                          
6 This asymmetry in preferences depending on the gain/loss domain is also known and the ‘valence effect’, 
which is not, however, equivalent to the ‘framing effect’ in the behavioural economics literature. The framing 
effects exist when the same information is provided in both conditions, just framed differently, which usually 
leads to ‘loss aversion’ – more risk seeking in the loss frame (see De Martino et al., 2006). In our task, the loss 
situation and the gain situation are different. Thus, contrary to the framing effect, being risk averse in one 
situation and risk seeking in another is not inherently ‘irrational’ in our task. 
7 Hsee and Weber (1997) only examined whether people can accurately predict the risk preferences of others 
(i.e., they did not study time preferences and did not ask the participants to actually make decisions on behalf of 
others). 
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This hypothesis predicts similar choices for self and other, which was not observed in our 
data. 
The preference-as-feeling hypothesis is based on a dual-process model assumption that 
one’s preference is an expression of one's feelings toward each choice option. Dual-process 
models propose that reflective or experiential systems differentially dominate choices for self 
and others. Specifically, when people make choices that go against their goals, such choices 
often are based on affective evaluations, an account known as the risk-as-feeling hypothesis 
(Hsee & Weber, 1997; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Stone, Yates, & Caruthers, 2002). This 
model suggests experiential processes, rewards and punishments, weigh more heavily in 
decisions for self than for others (Beisswanger, Stone, Hupp, & Allgaier, 2003; Rolls, 2005; 
Nicolle, Symmonds, & Dolan, 2011). In decisions about time, contrary to our results, this 
model predicts more impatient (discounted) choices for self, due to feelings driving the 
person to choose more immediate payoffs for self (McClure et al., 2004) and difficulty 
imagining the other person having as strong feelings (Fernandez-Duque & Wifall, 2007; Hsee 
& Weber, 1997). In decisions about risk, the preference-as-feeling hypothesis predicts more 
risk-averse choices for self, for both gains and losses, because people would decide for others 
partly on their own emotions, which often favour risk avoidance (Loewenstein et al., 2001), 
but due to difficulty considering others as having feelings as strong as one’s own, this 
preference should regress toward risk neutrality. This prediction does not explain the 
observed bigger gain-loss asymmetry in risk preferences when deciding for others. In 
summary, we do not find support for the preference-as-feeling model in intertemporal and 
risky decisions for self and others in reciprocal setting.  
Conclusions 
In the context of decisions for others involving risk and time, our experiments reveal 
how reciprocity may prompt precautionary preference which is moderated by social 
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uncertainty. This phenomenon might be more likely to occur when agents, as in our design, 
do not have information about the others’ particular goals. This is an important topic, because 
many important relationships involve decisions for each other, such as team situations where 
strangers are brought together to form a team with others to perform a task. Such reciprocal 
decision-making is also found in large organisations where deciders do not personally know 
the individuals affected by their decisions, but they realise those individuals are also making 
decisions affecting them. In such situations, the precautionary preferences may be amplified 
because the beneficiaries are often detached and abstract agents or groups, which brings 
uncertainty about their preferences and goals. Reciprocal decisions are also found in close 
relationships such as couples and friendships. In contrast, traditionally, research on surrogate 
decision-making has focused on one-sided (e.g., economic or medical) decisions taken not by 
the person who will ultimately gain or lose from the outcome, but instead by someone else 
(such aspolicy makers, managers, doctors, carers, next-of-kin and even strangers in a lab). 
Our modelling also revealed that choices are more random when deciding for others for 
both risk and time. This reveals increased uncertainty in decision-making for others, which is 
reflected in choice noisiness, or more formally the reliability with which decision values are 
translated into choices (De Martino et al., 2013). However, an alternative interpretation of the 
finding that choices are more random when deciding for others is in terms of differences in 
motivation – because people are more deliberate with their own money and less motivated to 
decide for others. There are two objections against this interpretation of the data. First 
objection is that the evidence is against such motivational accounts of self-other differences 
(e.g., Kray, 2000). Second objection is that such interpretation does not predict the specific 
patterns observed in our data. Choosing randomly and caring less about others in the risk task 
implies that decisions and risk preference parameters should average around risk neutrality 
for both gains and losses, i.e. the valence effect should be smaller for others, which is the 
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opposite of what we found. In the discounting study, more random preferences and decisions 
predicts more discounting for others, in line with what we found, but random decision-
making implies that both the average proportion of delayed choice and the discounting 
parameter (γ) for others should be around 0.50, not 0.11 as we observed (i.e., the random-
choice hypothesis predicts much more extreme levels of discounting than observed in our 
data).  
In order to corroborate our findings, future research should study the neural 
mechanisms involved in reciprocal decisions for others, especially when the beneficiary’s 
preferences for time and risk are not explicitly stated as in our task. Further research should 
also systematically investigate how concerns about reciprocity influence precautionary 
preferences (e.g., a condition in which decisions are made for other vs. a condition where 
decisions are made for other who also makes decision for self), including also independent 
measures of individual's reciprocity and confidence (that the choice is the one that the 
beneficiary would pick). Another potential research direction would be to build 
computational models of decision making, which model the uncertainty in terms of belief 
distributions about the future for self and other; and thus tease apart the interaction between 
uncertainty and precautionary preferences.  
In summary, our two experiments reveal unique biases in both the preferences and also 
in the decision rules used to make a choice that satisfies one’s own preferences compared to 
making choices on behalf of someone else; which is in line with the multi-stage general 
theoretical framework employed to understand decision making (DellaVigna, 2009). Those 
results also demonstrate how computational models can reveal the underlying processes in 
decision making. In politics and business, being aware of those decision processes and the 
self-others discrepancy in choice, may help policy-makers and managers introduce policies 
that better reflect people's willingness to trade off risk, time and benefits. 
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Table 1 
Intertemporal Choice According to Beneficiary (Self and Other) 
Measure Beneficiary N 
 Self Other 
 Mean SE Mean SE 
Time 
Discounting (γ) 
0.07 0.02 0.11 0.03 41 
          
Choice 
Randomness (β) 
2.43 0.54 1.68 0.49 41 
          
Proportion Later 
Choices 
0.80 0.03 0.75 0.03 41 
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Table 2 
Risky Choice According to Beneficiary (Self vs. Other) and Payoff Valence (Gain vs. Loss) 
Measure Beneficiary Valence Statistic N 
  Mean SE  
Proportion 
Risky Choices 
 
Self Gain .44 .028 40 
  Loss .40 .027 40 
Other Gain .49 .030 40 
  Loss .40 .032 40 
Risk Aversion 
Parameter (ρ) 
Self Gain -.04 .033 40 
  Loss -.07 .017 40 
Other Gain .00 .045 40 
  Loss -.13 .049 40 
Choice 
Randomness 
Parameter (β) 
Self Gain and Loss 3.45 .208 40 
Other Gain and Loss 2.61 .284 40 
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Figure 1.   An example trial screenshot for the delegated intertemporal choice task. 
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Figure 2.   Structure of the risky decision task on two separate trials. Figure 2a is an example 
of a gain trial choice for self, and Figure 2b is an example of a loss trial choice for other. 
 
2a 2b
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Appendix A 
Experimental Instruction for Experiment 1: Intertemporal Choice for Self and Others 
 
Welcome to the experiment! Take time to read these instructions carefully. If you do 
have any questions, please raise your hand and one of the co-ordinators will come to you and 
answer it privately. Please do not talk to anyone during the experiment. 
In the paragraphs below, we will describe the experiment. Firstly, as this experiment 
differs from most others in the lab, we need to provide some explanation about how the 
payments will work. In this experiment, in contrast to others run in the lab: 
(1) You will NOT be paid in cash. We will be paying using electronic payments. Either 
we can pay to a PayPal account or directly to your UK bank account - so you will need to 
provide details of one of these accounts.  
(2) Payments will not necessarily be made on the day of the experiment (this depends 
on choices made during the experiment). Some payments may be made later on (but even 
those paid on the day of the experiment will be paid electronically). 
(3) There will not be a show up fee. The show up fee element will be replaced by 
higher payments possible from decisions made during the experiment. Payments will be on 
average higher than most experiments of similar duration. 
If you have any queries about this, please raise your hand and the experimenter will 
come and answer it privately. 
Now, about the experiment!  
In this experiment, you will make 240 choices about different amounts of money to be 
paid. Specifically, each choice will have the format: 
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“Choose £X1 in Y1 weeks OR £X2 in Y2 weeks” where X1, X2, Y1, Y2 are numbers. 
If Y1 or Y2 are equal to zero, then that means “today”. You will make your choice by 
clicking on one of the two buttons on the screen. 
Not all 240 choices are made on behalf of yourself and nor will you be paid for every 
choice. In fact, one third of the choices relate to payments to you, one third to another subject 
in the laboratory that is male and to another subject in the laboratory that is female. 
The choices where you are deciding for yourself will have a screen with a black 
surround, the choices where you are deciding for another subject (male) in the laboratory will 
have a light blue surround and the choices where you are choosing on behalf of another 
subject (female)  in the laboratory will have a pink surround. The 240 choices will be in 6 
blocks of 40 choices where each of the 40 choices has the same beneficiary. 
After you have made your 240 choices, the computer will choose ONE choice at 
random to be paid. If the payment choice is a decision where you chose on behalf of someone 
else, then they will get the payment you chose AND you will get the payment they chose 
(although not necessarily for the same decision problem). 
At the end of the experiment, there will be a short survey and then we will arrange the 
payment information and provide receipts.  
All data from this experiment and questionnaire is held anonymously. That is, there is 
no unique link that could identify you with the data. 
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Appendix B 
Experimental Instruction for Experiment 2: Risky Choice for Self and Others 
 
Thank you for taking part in the experiment today. How much you earn depends on the 
choices made in the task, as well as an element of chance 
During this experiment, half the decisions you make will be on behalf of someone else 
and half on behalf of yourself. The person you decide on behalf of today (“your partner”) 
will also be deciding on your behalf. In the experiment, each participant will receive a 
starting amount of £12, will then gain or lose money from the decisions made on their behalf 
by their partner, and will also gain or lose money from their decisions made on their own 
behalf. The whole experiment takes about 25 minutes, of which the first half is for one 
beneficiary (your partner or yourself) and the second half for the other beneficiary. You will 
also receive £5 for attending (the show up fee). 
What happens in each trial? The structure of each trial is the same, whoever the 
beneficiary (your partner or yourself). In each trial, you have to make a choice between a 
gamble option and a sure option. Sometimes the decisions will be about gaining money (the 
“gain trials”) and sometimes about losing money (the “loss trials”). If you choose the sure 
option the beneficiary will get the outcome shown for certain, which is always gaining £3 for 
certain in the “gain trials” and losing £3 for certain in the “loss trials”. If you pick the gamble 
option, the beneficiary will get one of the outcomes shown on the pie chart, with the chance 
of getting that outcome shown by the size of that segment.  
In contrast to most other experiments you may have encountered at ELSE, you do not 
have a long time to think about your decision. What happens on each trial is as follows: 
1. The trial decision will appear on the screen (see example screenshots below) 
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2. After about 4 seconds to think about your choice, decision buttons will appear on the 
screen (two buttons marked “GAMBLE” and “SURE”) 
3. You have about 2 seconds to click  one of the buttons to register your choice after 
which the experiment will move onto the next trial. It is always better to make a choice 
within the 2 seconds, as if you don’t make a choice in the “gain trials” the beneficiary will get 
zero and in the “loss trials” the beneficiary will lose £6.  
 
A “gain trial” where the beneficiary is “you” 
 
 
A “loss trial” where the beneficiary is “partner” 
 
Other People’s Money     52 
 
 
You will not receive any feedback during the experiment. Instead, at the end, one of the 
“gain trials” and one of the “loss trials” that the you decided about on behalf of your partner 
and also one “gain trial” and one “loss trial” that you decided about for yourself will be 
selected at random and played out for real.  
So, at the end of the experiment, you will see four trials that you made decisions in and 
they will be played out. Your earnings and partner’s earnings for you will be added to the 
£12. After that, there will be a summary of the results. 
 
